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Abstract We present several generalizations of results for splitting authentication
codes by studying the aspect of multi-fold security. As the two primary results, we
prove a combinatorial lower bound on the number of encoding rules and a combinato-
rial characterization of optimal splitting authentication codes that are multi-fold secure
against spoofing attacks. The characterization is based on a new type of combinato-
rial designs, which we introduce and for which basic necessary conditions are given
regarding their existence.
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1 Introduction
Authenticity is one of the fundamental components in cryptography and information
security. Typically, communicating parties would like to be assured of the authenticity
of information they obtain via potentially insecure channels. Concerning unconditional
(theoretical) authenticity, authentication codes can be used to minimize the possi-
bility of an undetected deception. Their initial study appears to be that of Gilbert,
MacWilliams & Sloane [9]. A more general and systematic theory of authenticity was
developed by Simmons [22,23].
We primarily focus on authentication codes with splitting in this paper. In such
a code, several messages can be used to communicate a particular plaintext (non-
deterministic encoding). This concept plays an important role, for instance, in the con-
text of authentication codes that permit arbitration (see, for example, [13–15,24,25]).
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2We will deal with splitting authentication codes from a combinatorial point of view.
By studying the aspect of multi-fold security, we obtain several natural generalizations
of results on splitting authentication codes. As the two primary results, we prove a
combinatorial lower bound on the number of encoding rules and a combinatorial char-
acterization of optimal splitting authentication codes that are multi-fold secure against
spoofing attacks.
For splitting authentication codes that are one-fold secure against spoofing at-
tacks, Brickell [3] and Simmons [25] have established a combinatorial lower bound on
the number of encoding rules. We will give a combinatorial lower bound accordingly for
multi-fold secure splitting authentication codes. Ogata et al. [17] introduced splitting
balanced incomplete block designs (BIBDs). They proved basic necessary conditions
for their existence and derived a Fisher-type inequality. Furthermore, they established
an equivalence between splitting BIBDs and optimal one-fold secure splitting authen-
tication codes. We will extend the notion of splitting BIBDs to splitting t-designs.
Comprehensive necessary conditions regarding their existence will be given. Moreover,
we will prove an equivalence between splitting t-designs and optimal (t− 1)-fold secure
splitting authentication codes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the definition and concept
of multi-fold secure splitting authentication codes. We introduce splitting designs and
prove basic necessary conditions for their existence in Section 3. With respect to our
further purposes, we summarize in Section 4 the state-of-the-art for authentication
codes without splitting. In Section 5, lower bounds on deception probabilities and the
number of encoding rules are established for multi-fold secure splitting authentication
codes. A combinatorial characterization of optimal multi-fold secure splitting authen-
tication codes in terms of splitting designs is given in Section 6. We finally conclude
the paper and propose further research problems in Section 7.
2 Splitting Authentication Codes
Splitting authentication codes were first introduced by Simmons [21]. These codes are
useful, inter alia, for the analysis of authentication codes with arbitration. In particu-
lar, [15] gives an equivalence between splitting authentication codes and authentication
codes with arbitration.
We use the unconditional (theoretical) secure authentication model developed by
Simmons (e.g. [21–23,26]). Our notation follows, for the most part, that of [16,17,27].
In this model, three participants are involved: a transmitter, a receiver, and an oppo-
nent. The transmitter wants to communicate information to the receiver via a public
communications channel. The receiver in return would like to be confident that any
received information actually came from the transmitter and not from some opponent
(integrity of information). The transmitter and the receiver are assumed to trust each
other. Sometimes this is also called an A-code.
Let S denote a finite set of source states (or plaintexts), M a finite set of messages
(or ciphertexts), and E a finite set of encoding rules (or keys). Using an encoding rule
e ∈ E , the transmitter encrypts a source state s ∈ S to obtain the message m = e(s)
to be sent over the channel. The encoding rule is communicated to the receiver via a
secure channel prior to any messages being sent. When it is possible that more than
one message can be used to communicate a particular source state s ∈ S under the
same encoding rule e ∈ E , then the authentication code is said to have splitting. In this
3Table 1 An example of a splitting authentication code.
s1 s2
e1 {m1, m2} {m3,m5}
e2 {m2, m3} {m4,m6}
e3 {m3, m4} {m5,m7}
e4 {m4, m5} {m6,m8}
e5 {m5, m6} {m7,m9}
e6 {m6, m7} {m8,m1}
e7 {m7, m8} {m9,m2}
e8 {m8, m9} {m1,m3}
e9 {m9, m1} {m2,m4}
case, a message m ∈ M is computed as m = e(s, r), where r denotes a random number
chosen from some specified finite set R. If we define
e(s) := {m ∈M : m = e(s, r) for some r ∈ R}
for each encoding rule e ∈ E and each source state s ∈ S , then splitting means that
|e(s)| > 1 for some e ∈ E and some s ∈ S . In order to ensure that the receiver can
decrypt the message being sent, it is required for any e ∈ E that e(s) ∩ e(s′) = ∅ if
s 6= s′. For a given encoding rule e ∈ E , let
M(e) :=
⋃
s∈S
e(s)
denote the set of valid messages. For an encoding rule e and a set M ′ ⊆ M(e) of
distinct messages, we define
fe(M
′) := {s ∈ S : e(s) ∩M ′ 6= ∅},
i.e., the set of source states that will be encoded under encoding rule e by a message
in M ′. A received message m will be accepted by the receiver as being authentic if
and only if m ∈ M(e). When this is fulfilled, the receiver decrypts the message m by
applying the decoding rule e−1, where
e−1(m) = s if m = e(s, r) for some r ∈ R.
A splitting authentication code is called c-splitting if
|e(s)| = c
for every encoding rule e ∈ E and every source state s ∈ S. We note that an authenti-
cation code can be represented algebraically by a (|E| × |S|)-encoding matrix with the
rows indexed by the encoding rules e ∈ E , the columns indexed by the source states
s ∈ S , and the entries defined by aes := e(s). As a simple example, Table 1 displays
an encoding matrix of a 2-splitting authentication code for 2 source states, having 9
messages and 9 encoding rules (cf. Example 3).
42.1 Protection Against Spoofing Attacks
We address the scenario of a spoofing attack of order i (cf. [16]): Suppose that an oppo-
nent observes i ≥ 0 distinct messages, which are sent through the public channel using
the same encoding rule. The opponent then inserts a new message m′ (being distinct
from the i messages already sent), hoping to have it accepted by the receiver as authen-
tic. The cases i = 0 and i = 1 are called impersonation game and substitution game,
respectively. These cases have been studied in detail in recent years for authentication
codes without splitting (see, e.g., [28,29]) and with splitting (see, e.g., [2,6,17]). How-
ever, much less is known for the cases i ≥ 2 in particular for splitting authentication
codes.
For any i, we assume that there is some probability distribution on the set of
i-subsets of source states, so that any set of i source states has a non-zero probability
of occurring. For simplification, we ignore the order in which the i source states oc-
cur, and assume that no source state occurs more than once. Given this probability
distribution on the set S of source states, the receiver and transmitter also choose a
probability distribution on the set E of encoding rules, called an encoding strategy.
It is assumed that the opponent knows the encoding strategy being used. If splitting
occurs, then the receiver/transmitter will also choose a splitting strategy to determine
m ∈ M, given s ∈ S and e ∈ E (this corresponds to non-deterministic encoding). The
transmitter/receiver will determine these strategies to minimize the chance of being
deceived by the opponent. The deception probability Pdi denotes the probability that
the opponent can deceive the transmitter/receiver with a spoofing attack of order i.
3 Splitting Designs
There are natural and deep connections between authentication codes and combinato-
rial designs, see, for example, [4,10,17,18,27–29]. The close relationship between cryp-
tography and designs was presumably first revealed in Shannon’s classical paper [20]
on secrecy systems.
In order to give a combinatorial characterization of multi-fold secure splitting au-
thentication codes in the remainder of the paper, we define in this section a new type of
combinatorial designs. Let us first recall the classical notion of a combinatorial t-design
(see, for instance, [1]):
Definition 1 For positive integers t ≤ k ≤ v and λ, a t-(v, k, λ) design D is a pair
(X,B), satisfying the following properties:
(i) X is a set of v elements, called points,
(ii) B is a family of k-subsets of X, called blocks,
(iii) every t-subset of X is contained in exactly λ blocks.
By convention, b := |B| denotes the number of blocks. It is easily seen that
b = λ
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
.
For encyclopedic references on combinatorial t-designs, we refer to [1, 4]. A recent
treatment on highly regular designs and their applications in information and coding
theory can be found, e.g., in [11,12].
5The notion of a splitting balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) have been in-
troduced by Ogata et al. [17]. We will extend this concept to splitting t-designs:
Definition 2 For positive integers t, v, b, c, u, λ with t ≤ u and cu ≤ v, a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ)
splitting design D is a pair (X,B), satisfying the following properties:
(i) X is a set of v elements, called points,
(ii) B is a family of l-subsets of X, called blocks, such that every block Bi ∈ B (1 ≤ i ≤
|B| =: b) is expressed as a disjoint union
Bi = Bi,1 ∪ · · · ∪Bi,u
with
∣∣Bi,1∣∣ = · · · = ∣∣Bi,u∣∣ = c and |Bi| = l = cu,
(iii) every t-subset {xm}
t
m=1of X is contained in exactly λ blocks Bi = Bi,1∪· · ·∪Bi,u
such that
xm ∈ Bi,jm (jm between 1 and u)
for each 1 ≤ m ≤ t, and j1, . . . , jt are mutually distinct.
Example 1 A splitting 2-design is a splitting BIBD. As a simple example, take as point
set
X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
and as block set
B = {B1, . . . , B9}
with
B1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 5}}
B2 = {{2, 3}, {4, 6}}
B3 = {{3, 4}, {5, 7}}
B4 = {{4, 5}, {6, 8}}
B5 = {{5, 6}, {7, 9}}
B6 = {{6, 7}, {8, 1}}
B7 = {{7, 8}, {9, 2}}
B8 = {{8, 9}, {1, 3}}
B9 = {{9, 1}, {2, 4}}.
This gives a 2-(9, 9, 4 = 2× 2, 1) splitting design (see [17, Ex. 5.1]).
Example 2 A 3-(10, 15, 6 = 2× 3, 1) splitting design can be obtained (via a computer
search) by taking as point set
X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0}
and as block set
B = {B1, . . . , B15}
6with
B1 = {{1, 2}, {4, 0}, {5, 9}}
B2 = {{1, 3}, {2, 8}, {5, 0}}
B3 = {{1, 4}, {3, 8}, {6, 9}}
B4 = {{1, 5}, {4, 7}, {6, 8}}
B5 = {{1, 7}, {2, 3}, {4, 8}}
B6 = {{1, 8}, {2, 5}, {6, 9}}
B7 = {{1, 8}, {6, 7}, {9, 0}}
B8 = {{1, 9}, {2, 5}, {3, 7}}
B9 = {{1, 9}, {3, 4}, {7, 0}}
B10 = {{2, 4}, {5, 6}, {7, 9}}
B11 = {{2, 5}, {4, 7}, {3, 0}}
B12 = {{2, 9}, {6, 8}, {3, 0}}
B13 = {{2, 0}, {4, 5}, {6, 8}}
B14 = {{3, 7}, {4, 6}, {8, 0}}
B15 = {{3, 9}, {5, 7}, {6, 0}}.
We prove some basic necessary conditions for the existence of splitting designs:
Proposition 1 Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design, and for a posi-
tive integer s ≤ t, let S ⊆ X with |S| = s. Then the number of blocks containing each
element of S as per Definition 2 is given by
λs = λ
(
v−s
t−s
)
ct−s
(
u−s
t−s
) .
In particular, for t ≥ 2, a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design is also an s-(v, b, l = cu, λs)
splitting design.
Proof We count in two ways the number of pairs (T, Bi), where T := {xm}
t
m=1 ⊆ X
and Bi =
⋃u
j=1 Bi,j ∈ B such that
xm ∈ Bi,jm
for each 1 ≤ m ≤ t with j1, . . . , jt mutually distinct, and S := {x˜m}
s
m=1 ⊆ T . First,
each of the λs blocks Bi =
⋃u
j=1 Bi,j such that
x˜m ∈ Bi,jm
for each 1 ≤ m ≤ s with j1, . . . , js mutually distinct gives∏t−1
i=s(l − ic)
(t− s)!
= ct−s
(
u− s
t− s
)
such pairs. Second, there are (
v − s
t− s
)
such subsets T ⊆ X with S ⊆ T , each giving λ pairs by Definition 2. ⊓⊔
7As it is customary for t-designs, we also set r := λ1 denoting the number of blocks
containing a given point. The above elementary counting arguments give the following
assertions.
Proposition 2 Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design. Then the fol-
lowing holds:
(a) bl = vr.
(b)
(
v
t
)
λ = bct
(
u
t
)
.
(c) rct−1(u− 1) = λ2(v − 1) for t ≥ 2.
Remark 1 The above proposition extends the result [17, Lemma 5.1], where (b) and
(c) have been proved for the case when t = 2.
Since in Proposition 1 each λs must be an integer, we obtain furthermore the
subsequent necessary arithmetic conditions.
Proposition 3 Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design. Then
λ
(
v − s
t− s
)
≡ 0
(
mod ct−s
(
u− s
t− s
))
for each positive integer s ≤ t.
Ogata et al. [17] proved a Fisher-type inequality for splitting BIBDs. As a splitting
t-design with t ≥ 2 is also a splitting 2-design in view of Lemma 1, we derive
Proposition 4 If D = (X,B) is a t-(v, b, l = cu, λ) splitting design with t ≥ 2, then
b ≥
v
u
.
4 Authentication Codes without Splitting
With respect to our further purposes, we summarize the state-of-the-art for authenti-
cation codes without splitting:
The following theorems (cf. [16, 19]) give combinatorial lower bounds on cheating
probabilities as well as on the size of encoding rules for multi-fold secure authentication
codes:
Theorem 1 (Massey) In an authentication code without splitting, for every 0 ≤ i ≤
t, the deception probabilities are bounded below by
Pdi ≥
|S| − i
|M| − i
.
We remark that a code is called t-fold secure against spoofing if
Pdi = (|S| − i)/(|M| − i)
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
8Theorem 2 (Massey–Scho¨bi) If an authentication code without splitting is (t− 1)-fold
secure against spoofing, then the number of encoding rules is bounded below by
|E| ≥
(|M|
t
)
(|S|
t
) .
Such a code is called optimal if the number of encoding rules meets the lower bound
with equality. When the source states are known to be independent and equiproba-
ble, optimal authentication codes without splitting which are multi-fold secure against
spoofing have been characterized via t-designs (cf. [5, 19,27]).
Theorem 3 (DeSoete–Scho¨bi–Stinson) Suppose there is a t-(v, k, λ) design. Then
there is an authentication code without splitting for k equiprobable source states, having
v messages and λ
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing.
Conversely, if there is an optimal authentication code without splitting for k equiprob-
able source states, having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t − 1)-fold
secure against spoofing, then there is a t-(v, k, 1) design.
Combinatorial constructions of optimal multi-fold secure authentication codes with-
out splitting which simultaneously achieve perfect secrecy have been obtained recently
via the following theorem (see [10]).
Theorem 4 (Huber) Suppose there is a t-(v, k, 1) design, where v divides the number
of blocks b. Then there is an optimal authentication code without splitting for k equiprob-
able source states, having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t − 1)-fold
secure against spoofing and provides perfect secrecy.
5 Combinatorial Bounds for Splitting Authentication Codes
In this section, we give combinatorial lower bounds on deception probabilities, and a
combinatorial lower bound on the size of encoding rules for splitting authentication
codes that are multi-fold secure against spoofing.
We first state lower bounds on cheating probabilities for splitting authentication
codes (see [2,6]).
Theorem 5 (DeSoete–Blundo–DeSantis–Kurosawa–Ogata) In a splitting au-
thentication code, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ t, the deception probabilities are bounded below
by
Pdi ≥ min
e∈E
|M(e)| − i ·maxs∈S |e(s)|
|M| − i
.
A splitting authentication code is called t-fold secure against spoofing if
Pdi = min
e∈E
|M(e)| − i ·maxs∈S |e(s)|
|M| − i
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
We prove now a lower bound on the size of encoding rules for multi-fold secure
splitting authentication codes.
9Theorem 6 If a splitting authentication code is (t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing,
then the number of encoding rules is bounded below by
|E| ≥
t−1∏
i=0
|M| − i
|M(e)| − i ·maxs∈S |e(s)|
.
Proof Let M ′ ⊆ M be a set of i ≤ t − 1 distinct messages that are valid under a
particular encoding rule, in such a way that they define i different source states. Let
x ∈ M be any message not in M ′. We assume that there is no encoding rule e ∈ E
under which all messages inM ′∪{x} are valid and for which fe(x) /∈ fe(M
′). Following
the proof of Theorem 5, mutatis mutandis, yields
Pdi > min
e∈E
|M(e)| − i ·maxs∈S |e(s)|
|M| − i
,
a contradiction. Therefore, any set of t distinct messages is valid under at least one
encoding rule such that they define different source states. The bound follows now by
counting in two ways the number of t-subsets of messages that are valid under some
encoding rule such that they correspond to different source states. ⊓⊔
Analogously, we call a splitting authentication code optimal if the number of en-
coding rules meets the lower bound with equality.
Remark 2 The above theorem generalizes results by Brickell [3] and Simmons [25],
where a lower bound in the case of one-fold secure splitting authentication codes has
been established.
As a consequence, we obtain for c-splitting authentication codes the following lower
bounds:
Corollary 1 In a c-splitting authentication code,
Pdi ≥
c(|S| − i)
|M| − i
for every 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
Proof We set l := |M(e)| = c |S|. Then Theorem 5 yields
Pdi ≥
l − i · c
|M| − i
=
c(|S| − i)
|M| − i
.
⊓⊔
Corollary 2 If a c-splitting authentication code is (t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing,
then
|E| ≥
(|M|
t
)
ct
(|S|
t
) .
Proof Using Theorem 6, we may proceed as for Corollary 1. ⊓⊔
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Table 2 Splitting authentication code from a 2-(9, 9, 4 = 2× 2, 1) splitting design.
s1 s2
e1 {1,2} {3,5}
e2 {2,3} {4,6}
e3 {3,4} {5,7}
e4 {4,5} {6,8}
e5 {5,6} {7,9}
e6 {6,7} {8,1}
e7 {7,8} {9,2}
e8 {8,9} {1,3}
e9 {9,1} {2,4}
6 Combinatorial Characterizations of Optimal Splitting Authentication
Codes
Ogata et al. [17, Thms. 5.4 and 5.5] characterized in 2004 optimal splitting authenti-
cation codes that are one-fold secure against spoofing. Their combinatorial result is
based on splitting BIBDs.
Theorem 7 (Ogata–Kurosawa–Stinson–Saido) Suppose there is a 2-(v, b, l = cu, 1)
splitting design. Then there is an optimal c-splitting authentication code for u equiprob-
able source states, having v messages and
(
v
2
)
/[c2
(
u
2
)
] encoding rules, that is one-fold
secure against spoofing. Conversely, if there is an optimal c-splitting authentication code
for u source states, having v messages and
(
v
2
)
/[c2
(
u
2
)
] encoding rules, that is one-fold
secure against spoofing, then there is a 2-(v, b, l = cu, 1) splitting design.
An example is as follows (cf. [17, Ex. 5.2]):
Example 3 An optimal 2-splitting authentication code for u = 2 equiprobable source
states, having v = 9 messages and b = 9 encoding rules, that is one-fold secure against
spoofing can be constructed from the 2-(9, 9, 4 = 2× 2, 1) splitting design in Example 1.
Each encoding rule is used with probability 1/9. An encoding matrix is given in Table 2.
We give a natural extension of Theorem 7. We prove that optimal splitting authen-
tication codes that are multi-fold secure against spoofing can be characterized in terms
of splitting t-designs.
Theorem 8 Suppose there is a t-(v, b, l = cu, 1) splitting design with t ≥ 2. Then there
is an optimal c-splitting authentication code for u equiprobable source states, having v
messages and
(
v
t
)
/[ct
(
u
t
)
] encoding rules, that is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing.
Conversely, if there is an optimal c-splitting authentication code for u source states,
having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/[ct
(
u
t
)
] encoding rules, that is (t− 1)-fold secure against
spoofing, then there is a t-(v, b, l = cu, 1) splitting design.
Proof Let us first assume that there is an optimal c-splitting authentication code for
|S| := u source states, having |M| := v messages and |E| :=
(
v
t
)
/[ct
(
u
t
)
] encoding
11
rules, that is (t− 1)-fold secure against spoofing. In order to meet the lower bound in
Theorem 6 with equality, every set of t distinct messages must be valid under precisely
one encoding rule, in such a way that they define different source states. For e ∈ E , let
us define a block Be ∈ B as disjoint union
Be :=
u⋃
j=1
e(sj).
Then (X,B) = (M, {Be : e ∈ E}) is a t-(v, b, l = cu, 1) splitting design in view of
Definition 2.
To prove the other direction, let |M| := v. For every block Bi ∈ B with
Bi =
u⋃
j=1
Bi,j ,
we arbitrarily define an encoding rule eBi via
eBi(sj) := Bi,j
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ u. Using every encoding rule with equal probability 1/b establishes
the claim. ⊓⊔
We present an example:
Example 4 An optimal 2-splitting authentication code for u = 3 equiprobable source
states, having v = 10 messages and b = 15 encoding rules, that is two-fold secure
against spoofing can be constructed from the 3-(10, 15, 6 = 2× 3, 1) splitting design in
Example 2. Each encoding rule is used with probability 1/15. An encoding matrix is
given in Table 3.
7 Conclusion
We have given a combinatorial lower bound on the number of encoding rules for split-
ting authentication codes that are multi-fold secure against spoofing attacks. Moreover,
we have provided a combinatorial characterization of those codes that attain these
bounds. Our characterization was based on a new type of combinatorial designs, which
we introduced and for which basic necessary conditions regarding their existence were
given. For future research, at least two directions would be of interest:
(i) Construction of multi-fold secure splitting authentication codes: Using Theorem 8,
this asks for constructing t-(v, b, l = cu, 1) splitting design for t > 2. We remark
that in the case when t = 2, various combinatorial constructions have been ob-
tained recently in [7,8,30] via recursive and direct constructions by the method of
differences.
(ii) Including the aspect of perfect secrecy: Is it possible to give a characterization of
optimal splitting authentication codes that are multi-fold secure against spoofing
and simultaneously achieve perfect secrecy in the sense of Shannon? For the case
of multi-fold secure authentication codes without splitting such a result has been
established lately in [10] (cf. Theorem 4).
12
Table 3 Splitting authentication code from a 3-(10, 15, 6 = 2× 3, 1) splitting design.
s1 s2 s3
e1 {1,2} {4,0} {5,9}
e2 {1,3} {2,8} {5,0}
e3 {1,4} {3,8} {6,9}
e4 {1,5} {4,7} {6,8}
e5 {1,7} {2,3} {4,8}
e6 {1,8} {2,5} {6,9}
e7 {1,8} {6,7} {9,0}
e8 {1,9} {2,5} {3,7}
e9 {1,9} {3,4} {7,0}
e10 {2,4} {5,6} {7,9}
e11 {2,5} {4,7} {3,0}
e12 {2,9} {6,8} {3,0}
e13 {2,0} {4,5} {6,8}
e14 {3,7} {4,6} {8,0}
e15 {3,9} {5,7} {6,0}
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